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_________________________________________________________________
__________ CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVER ____________
ISSUE 6 APRIL 2000
_________________________________________________________________
Welcome to the sixth issue of the Corporate Europe Observer. We
open with four articles on the European Commission and its links
with corporate Europe. During the negotiations on the review of
the Amsterdam Treaty that will take place this year, CEO will run
an 'IGC-Watch' initiative, to monitor and report on corporate
lobbying activities around the treaty revision process. In this
issue, we get a glimpse of corporate ambitions for the treaty
revision, mainly through attempts to expand the Commission's
powers to negotiate in international fora such as the WTO.
We follow with an examination of the 'revolving door' phenomenon
between the European Commission and the corporate world and look
at a few recent cases. A short item on a special EC budget line
for sponsoring and promoting the creation of international
business roundtables follows. We end the EU section with an
article on the recent attempts by the Commission to restrict
public access to EU documents.
A brief report on European corporate lobbying at the WTO Seattle
Ministerial opens the following section, followed by an update on
the European Commission's Investment Network initiative. Next is
an article on corporate responses to the outcome, or lack
thereof, of the Seattle Ministerial. We present responses by
lobby groups such as UNICE and the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) as well as European think-tanks and PR companies.
The low profile business response after the ministerial obscures
the development of new strategies to deal with opposition against
neoliberal globalisation. Finally, we present the more
sophisticated corporate reaction to Seattle, that was unveiled at
the 30th world economic forum (WEF) meeting in Davos, last
January. At that meeting, more than 2000 industrialists, national
and international political leaders strategised how to put a
'human face' to globalisation in order to counter what is called
the backlash against globalisation.
In issue 5 of the Corporate Europe Observer, we wrote on the
controversial Global Compact, a new partnership between the
United Nations and major corporations. In this issue we report on
the new UN website which was launched in Davos.
We then follow with a brief review of Johann-Gunther König's book
"Alle Macht den Konzerne -- das Neue Europa im Griff der
Lobbyisten" ("All Power to the Corporations -- the New Europe
in the Grip of the Lobbyists"), a useful guide to Germany Inc.
that describes how the German corporate landscape is being
transformed by economic globalisation.
We finish with a report on the meeting of campaigners,
researchers and journalists working on the subject of
corporate political power which CEO organised in Córdoba,
Spain, last October. We also reprint the Córdoba Declaration
that resulted from that meeting.
_________________________________________________________________
CONTENTS
_________________________________________________________________
* Intergovernmental Conference 2000:
Business and the Amsterdam Leftovers
* Back to Business: Revolving Doors in Brussels
* EC Offers Funding for International Business Roundtables
* Texts, Lies & Red Tape: The EC's (Failed) Crusade For Secrecy
* European Industry in Seattle
* Update on the Investment Network: How the EC and Business
Prepared for WTO Investment Talks in Seattle
* Business Responses to Seattle
* Davos 2000: 'New Beginnings' for Global Capitalism?
* Toothless UN Website on Global Compact with TNCs
* Guide to "Germany Inc."
* CEO Hosts Meeting in Spain
* The Córdoba Declaration
* Disclaimer
___________________________________________________________________
This issue of the Corporate Europe Observer is brought to you by
Belén Balanyá, Ann Doherty, Olivier Hoedeman, Adam Ma'anit and Erik
Wesselius. Our special thanks go to Chris Grimshaw for helping out
with the editing.
Corporate Europe Observatory is a research and campaign group
targeting the threats to democracy, equity, social justice and
the environment posed by the economic and political power of
corporations and their lobby groups.
CEO DONORSHIP
If you would like to support our work financially, we
invite you to become donor of Corporate Europe Observatory.
CONTACT:
Corporate Europe Observatory
Paulus Potterstraat 20
1071 DA Amsterdam, Netherlands
tel/fax: +31-20-6127023
e-mail: <ceo@xs4all.nl>
website: <http://www.xs4all.nl/~ceo/>
_________________________________________________________________
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 2000:
BUSINESS AND THE AMSTERDAM LEFTOVERS
_________________________________________________________________
To accommodate the expansion of the EU with up to thirteen new
Member States, [1] the EU Treaty will be revised again this year,
at the Intergovernmental Conference ('IGC 2000'). During past
Treaty revisions, corporate lobbying campaigns have often
successfully enshrined corporate priorities into the EU Treaty.
[2] This article gives a preliminary overview of corporate
ambitions for the upcoming Treaty revision. One disturbing
example is the proposed expansion of the European Commission's
powers in WTO negotiations.
Corporate Lobbying for Amsterdam
During the previous Intergovernmental Conference, which resulted
in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), corporate lobby groups mounted an
active lobby campaign [3] around three main demands:
- to strengthen the power and 'ability to act' of the
European Union, especially the European Commission;
- to stick to previously agreed schedules for Economic
and Monetary Union and for enlargement of the European
Union to Central and Eastern Europe; and
- to avoid integrating new elements such as environmental
and social clauses, which were described as threats to
the competitiveness of EU business.
Although industry was very pleased with the Maastricht Treaty,
they wanted more. "We feel very strongly that Europe can not move
at the pace of the slowest," remarked European Roundtable of
Industrialists (ERT) Secretary- General Richardson in February
1997, "... the United States could do nothing if every decision
had to be ratified by 52 states." [4]
The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) was quite satisfactory for business,
but it failed to create "a better way of managing Europe." [5]
The more controversial aspects of institutional reform
(streamlining the European Commission as a kind of EU management
team, further limiting Member States' power of veto, and
extension of qualified majority voting and reweighing votes in
the Council of Ministers) were postponed for the current IGC.
Institutional Reform: Business as Usual
The scope of the IGC 2000 is modest compared to previous Treaty
revisions. As a result, corporate lobbying has been less
pronounced. So far, only the Union of Industrial and Employers'
Confederations of Europe (UNICE) has issued a (preliminary)
position paper. The influential EU Committee of American Chambers
of Commerce, AmCham (representing 'European companies of American
parentage'), is still gearing up its campaign. It has formed an
IGC working group which is preparing a position paper. The
European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), representing 47 of
the largest European TNCs, has very successfully influenced
previous Treaty revisions, [6] but seems less active and to have
left the initiative to other business groupings this time around.
Whilst the lobby groups appear relatively inactive, the role
played by corporate-dominated think tanks, however, may be
greater than during previous Treaty revisions. Both the European
Policy Centre [7] and Friends of Europe [8] have formed IGC
working groups where corporate leaders and EU representatives
meet regularly. We will keep a close watch on these think tanks
and report our findings in future issues of the Corporate Europe
Observer.
The UNICE position paper gives a good indication of the kind of
demands that will be put forward by corporate lobby groups.
Unsurprisingly, the IGC negotiators are asked to "take on board
some key business concerns." They demand that any reforms should
strengthen the EU's "capacity to take and implement decisions in
its areas of competence, and to respond effectively to the global
challenges it faces." Competitiveness should be strengthened and
economic and monetary union and convergence of the EU's economies
should be guaranteed. Existing Single Market law should not be
'diluted' by the accession of new Member States. UNICE also
pleads for increased capacity for the EU to defend and promote
common European interests at international level. [9]
By demanding that new EU Member States must adopt all Single
Market legislation, and that existing members should comply
fully, UNICE aims to consolidate the neoliberal thrust of EU
policies. A new target date for "completion of the Single Market"
should keep things on track. However UNICE has some reservations
regarding closer intergovernmental cooperation by groups of
Member States -- namely 'flexibility'. A "balance between
harmonisation and competition of policies in an enlarged EU" is
deemed crucial. [10]
Power Play in the WTO
During the negotiations on the Amsterdam Treaty, business
strongly pushed for new powers for the European Commission in
international negotiations on trade and investment, such as in
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Both UNICE and the ERT
proposed that the power of the European Commission to bargain on
behalf of EU Member States should be extended to all external
commercial issues, including trade in services, investment and
the protection of intellectual property. This demand was backed
by the President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer in a
letter he sent to EU heads of state and governments a few days
before the Amsterdam Summit in June 1997. But despite lobbying by
business and the Commission, French President Jacques Chirac
blocked the proposals for revision of the relevant Article 113 of
the Maastricht Treaty during the Amsterdam Summit. Afterwards,
ERT Secretary-General Keith Richardson bitterly remarked that
"Europe is poorer and weaker because of this failure." [11]
The WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle showed the risks of
shifting more negotiating power to the European Commission in the
field of foreign economic policy. In a last- ditch attempt to
launch a new Round of trade negotiations, EU Trade Commissioner
Pascal Lamy conceded to US demands to set up a biotechnology
working group in the WTO, despite having no mandate to do so.
Such controversial deals could be blocked by representatives of
Member State governments. Under the Amsterdam Treaty, WTO
negotiations are a shared responsibility between the Council of
Ministers and the European Commission. If the Commission had
negotiated on behalf of the Member States, there would have been
no delegations from Member States. In such a situation,
controversial deals can only be revoked afterwards, and most
probably Lamy would have gotten away with them.
The campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI) has clearly shown the advantage of shared responsibility
(and veto powers for individual Member States). In the OECD
negotiations on international investment rules, the role of the
EC was limited and EU governments had a great deal of
independence. In the anti- MAI campaigns, national governments
were targeted, and success in one country (France) was
instrumental in sinking the MAI.
Unfortunately, the IGC 2000 treaty revision provides a new chance
for the Commission and its business allies to extend the European
Commission's powers in external commercial policy. The lobbying
campaign has already begun. In one of his first acts as
Commission president, Romano Prodi nominated a "High-Level
Reflection Group" to "advise the Commission on the issues which
the next Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) should address."
[12] By appointing Lord Simon, former BP chairman and former
vice-chair of the European Roundtable of Industrialists, as one
of the three members of this 'neutral expert group' [13],
Commission President Prodi ensured incorporation of business
concerns into the final report.
Indeed the Reflection Group advised the Commission to "revisit...
the question of external representation of the Union, in subjects
like trade in services or international monetary matters." [14]
The advice was taken further in the Commission's official Opinion
on the Treaty Revision. [15] The Commission writes that it "would
prefer a substantial amendment of the scope of Article 133
(Article 113 in the Maastricht Treaty) by extending it to
services, investment and intellectual property rights. Article
133 EC should be redrafted accordingly."
Remarkably, the Commission proposes that as a general rule, the
Parliament would be consulted on the conclusion of international
economic treaties, whereas assent of the EP would be needed for
"the conclusion of agreements with important economic and
commercial implications worldwide." It is left unclear who
decides when that is the case. Also it is not clear if the assent
right for the Parliament would extend to the negotiating mandate
of the European Commission, which until now was decided upon by
the Council of Ministers and (theoretically) assented to by
national parliaments. Thus, the Commission proposal would mean
removing controlling power from national parliaments while
handing back only limited controlling power to the European
Parliament.
We will continue our reportage of the corporate lobbying around
the IGC 2000 in future issues of the Corporate Europe Observer.
-----
Notes
-----
1. On 31 March 1998, accession negotiations were initiated
with six applicant countries: Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the
Czech Republic, Slovenia and Cyprus. At the Helsinki Summit
on 12 December 1999, the Member States endorsed a proposal
by the European Commission to open negotiations with
Romania, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria
and Malta. Accession of all candidate countries to the EU
would mean an area increase of 34% and a population
increase of 105 million.
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/index.htm>
2. See previous publications by Corporate Europe Observatory:
- "Europe Inc.: Dangerous Liaisons Between EU
Institutions and Industry", Corporate Europe Observatory,
Amsterdam 1997
- "The Amsterdam Summit in Retrospect: Maastricht II and
Corporate Lobby Successes", CEObserver, Zero Issue,
October 1997.
- "Europe Inc.: Regional & Global Restructuring and the
Rise of Corporate Power", Balanyá et al., Pluto Press,
London, January 2000.
3. Ibid.
4. Personal interview with Keith Richardson, Brussels,
21 February 1997.
5. Keith Richardson, "Managing Europe: the Challenge to the
Institutions", February 1998.
6. See CEO publications listed in note 2.
7. For more info on the European Policy Centre:
- "The European Policy Centre", CEObserver Issue 2,
October 1998
- "European Policy Centre Strikes Back",
CEObserver Issue 3, June 1999
- EPC website: <http://www.theepc.be/>
8. "Friends of Europe is a non-profit organisation whose
activities are directed by a Board of Trustees under the
Chairmanship of Vicomte Etienne Davignon. It is an
organisation without national or political bias and aims
to promote discussion, research and new thinking on the
issues shaping the future of European integration."
Information provided by the secretariat of Friends of
Europe.
N.B. Former Commissioner Davignon is a prominent member
of the European Roundtable of Industrialists and
president of the Association for Monetary Union in Europe.
9. UNICE, "Preliminary UNICE Statement in View of the
Intergovernmental Conference", Brussels, 3 December 1999.
10. Ibid.
11. Keith Richardson, "Managing Europe: the Challenge to the
Institutions", February 1998.
12. "Informal meeting of designated Commission",
Press Release, 27 August 1999.
13. The other members of the expert group were former Belgian
Prime Minister Dehaene and former President of the German
Federal Republic Von Weizsäcker.
14. Jean-Luc Dehaene, David Simon, Richard von Weizsäcker,
"The Institutional Implications of Enlargement; Report to
the European Commission", Brussels, 18 October 1999.
15. "Adapting the Institutions to Make a Success of
Enlargement; Commission Opinion in accordance with
Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union on the calling
of a Conference of Representatives of the Governments of
the Member States to amend the Treaties",
Brussels, 26 January 2000 [COM (2000) 34].
_________________________________________________________________
BACK TO BUSINESS: REVOLVING DOORS IN BRUSSELS
_________________________________________________________________
In March 1999, an independent investigative committee [1] accused
the European Commission of having lost control of an increasingly
corrupt bureaucracy, which led to the fall of the Santer
Commission. Only three months later, acting Industry Commissioner
Martin Bangemann caused another scandal by announcing that he
would move to the executive board of Spanish telecommunications
giant Telefónica. But indignation at these scandals turned out to
be short-lived. When two of Mr. Bangemann's former colleagues
also moved to the corporate world, Brussels remained silent. The
revolving doors in Brussels are still wide open...
The Bangemann Transfer
On 1 July 1999, acting Industry Commissioner Martin
Bangemann announced that he planned to join the Board of
Directors of Spanish telecommunications giant Telefónica,
and that he wanted to resign from his duties in the
European Commission. Jubilant Telefónica chairman Juan
Villalonga nicknamed Bangemann "our Ronaldo", comparing
the move of the former Commissioner with the transfer of a
highly praised football player.
Bangemann's move was condemned by his colleagues. The
Commission said the correct way to approach taking up such
a job would be to resign first and to negotiate the new job
afterwards. Bangemann was dismissed from his function,
and his duties were taken over by Competion Commissioner
Karel van Miert. Although Bangemann wanted to start at
Telefónica as soon as possible, he was told to wait until the
Commission had decided how to handle his 'unprecedented
move'.
Bangemann's move was blunt and over-hasty, but it was not
at all unprecedented. The Commission has a long tradition of
'revolving doors' to top positions in the private sector and
vice-versa. Examples include former Commissioners Etienne
Davignon (now Société Générale), François Ortoli (afterwards
CEO of Elf) and Peter Sutherland (now British Petroleum and
Goldman-Sachs) or Pirelli's Ricardo Perissich who used to be
Industry Director-General in his former job at the European
Commission. Bangemann may have thought of these
predecessors, when at a press conference a few days after
announcing his move, he stated that "it would be hard to
prove a conflict of interests."
However, Martin Bangemann had been responsible for EU
information and telecommunications policies since 1992
and his relationship with Telefónica dates back to at least
1994. In that year, he included Telefónica's then chairman,
Cándido Velázques-Gastelu, in the so-called "Bangemann
High Level Group on the Information Society". [2]
In a quick damage-control operation, the Council of Ministers
officially dismissed Mr. Bangemann from his duties as acting
Commissioner on July 9th. According to the judgement of the
Council, Bangemann had failed to fulfill his obligations
under Article 213 of the EU Treaty, especially the obligations
to "honesty and discretion"; [3] he should never have
accepted a position in the Telefónica Board of Directors. In
line with the provisions of the Treaty, the Council brought a
case before the European Court of Justice to suspend
Bangemann's pension rights if he joins the executive board
of Telefónica. The court case was trumpeted loudly by the
Council in July. A few months later, when the case was
withdrawn on the basis of some empty promises by
Bangemann, [4] the Council found it convenient not to issue
any press release.
A Code of Conduct for Commissioners
In another attempt to save the face of the Brussels
institutions, the designated Commission of Romano Prodi
had published a Code of Conduct for Commissioners on 17
July 1999. [5] The most important innovations in this code
are an obligation for Commissioners to declare their financial
interests and assets in detail and the introduction of a
'cooling down period' of one year after the resignation of
Commissioners, during which they may not engage in
occupations related to issues that fell under their
responsibility in the Commission. When needed, an "ad hoc
ethical committee" will decide if there is a breach of the
obligations under article 213(2) of the EU Treaty.
This anemic Code of Conduct cannot be considered a serious
attempt to close the revolving doors between the European
Commission and the private sector. The one year cooling
down period is too short, especially when one takes into
account that Commissioners receive up to 65% of their
former income over a period of five years after stepping
down from their public function. [6] Furthermore, the Code of
Conduct doesn't specify any new sanctions beyond those
already contained in the EU Treaty (withdrawal of pension
rights and transitional payments).
The Code served well to take the sting out of the debate in
the European Parliament on the 21st July. At this first
session of the newly elected Parliament, many MEPs strongly
criticised the 'Bangemann affair', [7] and the Parliament
adopted a resolution condemning Bangemann's move.
However, no amendmends to the draft Code of Conduct were
proposed, and when the Council withdrew its case against
Bangemann in December, the Parliament remained silent.
Back to Business as Usual
Some of Mr. Bangemann's former colleagues seem to have
interpreted the mild treatment he received and the lack of
will in the European Parliament to address this form of
corruption as a signal to follow in his footsteps and pass
through the revolving doors into the corporate sector. On
October 1st 1999, US investment bank Warburg Dillon Reed
(a subsidiary of Swiss megabank UBS) announced that Sir
Leon Brittan (former Trade Commissioner) would soon
become its vice-chairman. [8]
As Trade Commissioner, Sir Leon had been responsible for
negotiating the WTO agreement on financial services -- an
agreement designed to improve market access for banks and
other financial players in the 'emerging markets' of the
South. During these negotiations, Brittan worked closely with
the influential Financial Leaders Group, of which UBS is an
active member. [9]
More recently, it was announced that former Competition
Commissioner Karel van Miert is expected to join the
advisory boards of both Philips Electronics [10] and Swiss-
based aviation group SairGroup [11] in the spring of 2000.
When in office, Van Miert took several decisions directly
affecting both companies.
Considering these facts, there is a shocking lack of political
will, both in the Commission and the European Parliament,
to stop the blurring of borders between business and politics
and to close the revolving doors once and for all. Less than a
year after the fraud and corruption crash of the Santer
Commission, it seems Brussels is 'back to business as usual'.
-----
Notes
-----
1. Committee of Independent Experts, "First Report on
Allegations Regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism in
the European Commission", 15 March 1999.
2. Members of the High-Level Group on the Information
Society: Martin Bangemann (European Commission), Enrico
Cabral da Fonseca (Campanhia Comunicaçaoes nacionais),
Peter Davis (Reed Elsevier), Carlo de Benedetti (Olivetti /
ERT), Pehr Gyllenhammar (Volvo / ERT), Lothar Hunsel (T-
Mobil), Pierre Lescure (Canal+), Pascual Maragall (mayor of
Barcelona), Gaston Thorn (Cie. Luxembourgeoise de
Telediffusion / CLT), Cándido Velázquez-Gastelu (Telefónica
/ ERT), Peter Bonfield (ICL), Etienne Davignon (Société
Générale de Belgique / ERT), Jean-Marie Descarpentries
(Bull), Brian Ennis (IMS), Hans-Olaf Henkel (IBM Europe),
Anders Knutsen (Bang & Olufsen), Constantin Makropoulos
(Hellenic Information Systems), Romano Prodi (IRI),
Jan Timmer (Philips Electronics / ERT ), Heinrich von
Pierer (Siemens / ERT).
Please note that this information relates to the year 1994.
As indicated, 6 of the 20 members of the Bangemann Group
also belonged to the European Roundtable of Industrialists.
3. Art 213 (2) of the "Consolidated Version of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community": "The Members of
the Commission may not, during their term of office, engage
in any other occupation, whether gainful or not. When
entering upon their duties they shall give a solemn
undertaking that, both during and after their term of
office, they will respect the obligations arising therefrom
and in particular their duty to behave with integrity and
discretion as regards the acceptance, after they have
ceased to hold office, of certain appointments or
benefits. In the event of any breach of these obligations,
the Court of Justice may, on application by the Council or
the Commission, rule that the Member concerned be,
according to the circumstances, either compulsorily retired
in accordance with Article 216 or deprived of his right to
a pension or other benefits in its stead."
4. The case against Bangemann was withdrawn on 17 December
1999, on condition that Bangemann would also withdraw his
case against the Council. The Council justified its
decision by referring to the promises that Bangemann made
in a letter to the Council dated 10 December 1999, namely
that he would not join the 'consejo administrativo' of
Telefónica before 1 July 2000 (thus complying with the 1
year 'cooling off' period in the new Code of Conduct for
Commissioners), that he would not represent the
interests of third parties (including Telefónica) at the
EU institutions until 31 December 2001 and not make use of
any confidential information that he had access to as a
Commissioner.
5. The Code of Conduct came into force when Romano Prodi's new
Commission came into office (18 September 1999). The
provisions of the Code of Conduct do not bind members of
previous Commissions.
6. Article 7 of Regulation No 422/67/EEC, No 5/67/Euratom,
amended in Regulation (ECSC, EEC, Euratom) No 1546/73 of
the Council of 4 June 1973.
7. Minutes of the plenary debate in the European Parliament on
the position of Mr. Bangemann, Brussels 21 July 1999.
Available on the EP web site.
8. "Sir Leon Brittan to join Warburg Dillon Read as Vice
Chairman", Warburg Dillon Reed press release, 1 October 1999.
9. For more info on the Financial Leaders Group, see:
- "WTO Millennium Bug: TNC Control over Global Trade
Politics", CEObserver, Issue 4, July 1999;
- "Europe Inc.: Regional and Global Restructuring and the
Rise of Corporate Power", Balanyá ... [et al], Pluto Press,
London, 2000.
10. Philips press release, 17 February 2000. As Competition
Commissioner, Van Miert investigated the techno-lease
construction, a sophisticated construction through which
Philips received massive Dutch government funding. In the
end, Van Miert approved the construction.
11. SAirGroup press release, Zurich, 6 March 2000.
According to the press release "Karel Van Miert is a
leading authority on European market and competition issues".
_________________________________________________________________
EC OFFERS FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ROUNDTABLES
_________________________________________________________________
Readers of the Corporate Europe Observer will be familiar with
the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), the group of EU and
US based industrialists initiated by the European Commission and
the US government. The mushrooming of EU business roundtables
involving CEOs from other parts of the world is facilitated by
generous funding from the European Commission (EC). The EC's
enterprise directorate has a special budget line for the
"promotion of international business-to-business dialogue." [1]
"From an EU standpoint," the announcement on the EC's website
explains, "such dialogue should contribute to enhancing the
global competitiveness of EU business and lead to recommendations
to the public authorities of both regions on how to achieve such
objectives." [2] The EC offers to pay up to 50% of the costs of
"conferences, seminars and workshops as well as their preparatory
or follow-up activities" and lists examples of business dialogues
it already supported: EU-Japan Business Round Table,
Transatlantic Business Dialogue with the United States of
America, EU-Russia Business Round Table, EU-Taiwan Business
Round Table, EU-ASEAN Business Round Table and Mercosur-EU
Business Forum. [3]
If you want to know whether the EU has funded an international
business roundtable targeting a region with your particular
interest, contact the civil servant responsible for the budget
line:
DG III/A/2 -- Jean-Pierre Bou -- fax: +32-2-296.98.52, E-mail:
Jean-Pierre.Bou@dg3.cec.be
-----
Notes
-----
1. DG III Grant Theme 18, in 1999 with a budget of 150.000
euro.
2. Website of the EC's DG Enterprise:
<europa.eu.int/comm/dg03/directs/dg30/grants/theme18.htm>
3. Ibid.
_________________________________________________________________
TEXTS, LIES & RED TAPE: THE EC'S (FAILED) CRUSADE FOR SECRECY
_________________________________________________________________
Opposition from campaigners defending freedom of information may
have managed to prevent European Commission (EC) attempts to
further restrict public access to EU documents. The EC had hoped
to rollback the scope of the existing rules, which, despite many
loopholes still, are an important democratic tool. CEO, for
example, makes use of this public right to information to gain
access to key documents and information which exposes the links
between industry and EC. [1]
To counter strong public criticism of the European Union being
secretive, the right of access to information was included in the
1991 Maastricht Treaty. This resulted in the various EU
institutions developing rules by which citizens can apply for
access to documents. [2] In practice these rules have, however,
proven to be no guarantee of transparency. Statewatch, a UK-based
group monitoring civil liberties in the EU, took seven cases to
the European Ombudsman after the European Council had rejected
access to documents, and won six of them. Heidi Hautala, Finnish
member of the European Parliament, had to go to the European
Court of Justice to force the Council to give her access to
sensitive documents on nuclear issues.
A review of the existing rules is scheduled in the 1997 Amsterdam
Treaty, which describes itself as "a new stage in the process of
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in
which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as
possible to the citizen." [3] The European Commission was given
the mandate to make a proposal for new rules which are to be
approved before May 2000 (two years after the treaty entered into
force). However, rather than removing the loopholes in the
current rules, the EC drew up a proposal that would seriously
restrict access to documents.
It is normal practice that a discussion paper is circulated for
public consultation before the process of drafting new
regulations start, but ironically the discussion paper on access
to information (drafted by officials from the three institutions
-- Commission, Parliament and Council of Ministers) was not made
public by the Commission. Statewatch obtained a leaked copy in
April 1999 and revealed a very restrictive proposal which "would
set the clock back and reimpose the secrecy of the pre-Maastricht
days." [4] The proposal would practically have forbidden public
access to internal documents relevant for ongoing policy
discussions. [5] The text also suggested to create a more
'flexible system', which would have limited the right to appeal
rejections. After having faced heavy critique, also from the
European Parliament, the proposal, was withdrawn in June 1999.
The Commission continued its remarkable authoritarian approach
and did not write a new discussion paper, but instead released a
draft regulation, excluding civil society from any input in the
process. The draft legislation paid lip service to transparency,
but included even more restrictions to the right of access which
had been in the discussion paper. Working papers, for instance,
were only to be released after the legislation is approved.
Reproduction of any documents released would be forbidden.
Moreover, the proposal suggested that Member States would have to
apply the same principles and limitations. It would, in other
words, force national governments to become as closed as EU
institutions.
A new wave of critique forced the Commission to rewrite the
proposed legislation. On January 26th, the Commission approved a
final version which expands the right to access to cover not only
documents produced by the three institutions, but also documents
by third parties which are in the possession of the EU
institutions. [6] The new rules will apply only for documents
received by the institutions after the new legislation is in
place and a further limitation is that those who produced the
document can ask for confidentiality. If for instance CEO would
apply for the documents given to the EC by a corporate lobby
group, one can expect that these groupings will request
confidentiality.
The draft approved by the Commission restricts the current rules
for access to information by substantially narrowing the
definition of "documents". For instance, it excludes documents
reflecting free and frank discussions or advice as part of
internal consultations or deliberations as well as informal
messages. This is a bottomless bag which can be used to refuse
many requests for access to documents. The Commission argues that
it needs the "space to think" to formulate policy before it
enters the public domain. Policy made in the glare of publicity
"is often poor policy," the EC argues. Moreover, the proposal
substantially increases the number of "exceptions", cases in
which requests can be refused. [7]
The proposal now has to be approved by the European Parliament
and the Council, which have the right to amend the text. Public
pressure might result in improvements, but the EC proposal is a
very weak basis for realising the lofty promises of the Amsterdam
Treaty.
-----
Notes
-----
1. As reported in previous issues of the Corporate Europe
Observer (Issues 2 and 3), CEO has in the last two years
been engaged in a systematic attempt to gain access to
documents regarding the contacts between the Commission
and corporate lobby groups. Despite the simple procedure
described in the law, reality learns that one has to arm
oneself with large doses of patience and perseverance to
deal with rejections on weak grounds, long delays and/or
complete silence. But after many appeals, we have succeeded
in getting access to some revealing documents. It was
through an Access to Information request that we learnt
about the Investment Network (IN), the EC's process of
consultation with industry on international investment
issues (related to the proposed WTO Millennium Round) --
a 'dialogue' the EC failed to inform NGOs about.
2. The Council's rules go back to 1993 (Council Decision
93/731/EC of 20 December 1993 on public access to
Council documents), the Commission's to 1994 (Commission
Decision 94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom of 8 February 1994 on
public access to Commission documents), whereas the
European Parliament adopted its current rules in 1997
(European Parliament Decision on public access to
Parliament documents of 10 July 1997).
3. The quote is from article A of the Amsterdam Treaty. The
review is outlined in article 255 of the Amsterdam Treaty.
4. Tony Bunyan, Statewatch editor, quoted in press release
26 April 1999, "EU Plans to Undermine Citizens Right of
Access to Documents".
5. The draft proposed to exclude working documents intended as
contributions to internal deliberations from the scope of
the right of access. That would mean that minutes of
meetings, briefings, reflection notes, mission reports,
etc., would be excluded. It is precisely these documents
which are usually the subject of the requests, not the
official documents which are the end result of policy
making.
6. European Commission, proposal for a regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council regarding public
access to documents of the European Parliament, the Council
and the Commission, Explanatory Memorandum.
7. Ibid.
_________________________________________________________________
EUROPEAN INDUSTRY IN SEATTLE
_________________________________________________________________
While tens of thousands of protestors were jamming the streets of
Seattle during the WTO Ministerial Conference last year, up in
the conference rooms and luxury suites of many four star hotels,
business carried on as usual. Insulated from the sounds of
protest and the clouds of tear gas, lobby teams from the major
industry groups met daily to coordinate their strategies and
update each other with the latest information. Almost all of the
major European and international lobby groups had a presence in
Seattle, including UNICE (the Union of Industrial and Employers'
Confederations of Europe), the ESN (European Services Network)
and the TABD (Transatlantic Business Dialogue).
UNICE in Seattle: An Opportunity Not Missed
"By being present in Seattle, European business wants to make its
views heard and listened to. UNICE, together with its national
member organisations from across Europe and representatives of
European business sectoral organisations will not miss such an
opportunity."
-- Dirk Hudig, Secretary General of UNICE [1]
By far the most visible European lobby group in Seattle was the
employers confederation- UNICE. Often sighted with European
delegates and other officials, its team of over 20 lobbyists were
hard at work championing the cause of industry. One of the chief
reasons UNICE committed to getting such a strong presence in
Seattle was "linked to the strong lobby of labour, consumer,
environmental and development non-governmental organisation
(NGOs) in the trade policy debate", said UNICE head, Hudig. [2]
Citing the failure of the MAI as an example why business should
be more proactive in its lobbying efforts, Hudig called for
increased cooperation among business groupings and a more
coordinated lobbying strategy: "The objective is also to join
forces to counteract with the impressive media campaign launched
around the world by many activist NGOs to denounce globalisation
and block the start of any negotiations." [3]
UNICE's sixty-six page lobby document "UNICE and the WTO
Millennium Round" details European industry's priorities for a
new 'Round' of multilateral trade negotiations. Items covered,
include the 'Singapore issues' of investment, market access,
government procurement, trade facilitation and competition
policy. Other issues include electronic commerce, services,
agriculture, and intellectual property as well as environment and
labour.
With regards to investment, UNICE calls for "a new approach and
not an attempted second-coming of the MAI," deeming it as one of
its "highest priorities." [4] However, the "new approach" is not
new at all. Instead of demanding a comprehensive agreement on
investment in one fell swoop, they call for an entry-level
agreement on foreign direct investment, with full liberalisation
of investment as the long term goal. [5]
Elsewhere, UNICE calls for, among other things, increased
cooperation between the World Bank and the IMF, a European Union
"offensive" position on agriculture, and rejection of core
labour and environmental standards in the WTO. While the position
paper states that it is not realistic to undergo further
negotiations on the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), a joint press release by
UNICE and Keidanren (the largest Japanese corporate lobby group)
in October contradicts this by demanding full implementation of
the TRIPs agreement and calling for new negotiations to begin
with a "single undertaking" in a new round. [6]
By far one of the biggest initiatives of UNICE is in the
promotion of comprehensive services liberalisation through its
work in the founding of the European Services Network.
European Services Network
"I am very pleased to see how quickly and enthusiastically the
different services sectors have organised themselves to provide
business input for the GATS 2000 negotiations. Our negotiating
priorities need to be rooted in the real concerns of business and
we will be paying very close attention indeed to the negotiating
priorities that the ESN identifies."
-- Former Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan [7]
Claiming to be responding to the request by the European
Commission and the Member States for more contributions from
business with regards to trade policy, Barclays Bank Chairman,
Andrew Buxton with the aid of UNICE and other European services
firms and associations as well as enthusiastic support from the
Commission, formed the European Services Network. [8] The ESN's
primary purpose is to lobby for services liberalisation during
the negotiations on the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) in 2000, but that didn't stop the ESN, with the help of
UNICE and others to champion their cause in Seattle.
Currently, services agreements in the WTO are varied and have
different members and different levels of commitments by Members
States. The ESN, and other services lobbies such as the US
Coalition of Services Industries, and the Global Services Network
umbrella group, are pushing for a comprehensive services
agreement stringing together all the existing WTO agreements as
well as further liberalisation of the services sector as a whole.
In a policy document distributed to the Seattle delegates, the
ESN praised bilateral and regional initiatives such as the
Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) for their achievements
in services liberalisation, but stressed the need for a 'firm'
and 'comprehensive' multilateral agreement on services to be part
of any new round in the WTO. [9] The elements of such an
agreement, as outlined in the ESN document, include many of the
elements we've come to be familiar with from the MAI, such as
standstill and rollback of national legislation regulating trade
and investment in services, broad coverage and definition of
services with minimal exceptions, a concept of investor 'rights',
national treatment and most favoured nation status, and severe
restrictions on a Member State's ability to apply 'emergency
safeguards' for example to protect public health. [10]
With the upcoming services negotiations on the minds of many of
the Seattle delegates at the time, such demands may not have
fallen on deaf ears. The majority of corporate sponsors of the
WTO Ministerial itself through the Seattle Host Organisation,
were major players in services industries, such as air transport
services (Boeing, Lufthansa, and Northwest), telecommunications
and postal services (US West, AT&T, UPS, FedEx), financial
services (Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank of America, Deloitte &
Touche), and information technologies (Microsoft, IBM, Hewlett
Packard, Intel), among others. [11]
TABD in Seattle?
As we reported in our briefing "Transatlantic Business Dialogue
(TABD): Putting the Business Horse Before the Government Cart",
the TABD claims to set the agenda for the EU and US negotiators
in the WTO. [12] At their Berlin summit in October of last year,
over 120 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of EU-US TNCs met with
their trade representatives and WTO officials, to do just that.
As such, the main thrust and substance of TABD influence is
largely in the runup to WTO negotiations rather than direct
involvement.
Therefore, it came as some surprise to see that the TABD was
holding private meetings in the Madison hotel in Seattle during
the Ministerial Conference. Normally, the CEOs hold two official
meetings a year, and the rest of the time they work within
various working groups. An official TABD presence at a WTO
meeting therefore, is something quite new. All attempts to get
information about the TABD in Seattle, were met with stiff
resistance.
The WTO refused to publish information on who is registered as an
NGO, despite not being able to provide any plausible reason why
the information should be kept confidential. Nor were they
willing to provide contact details for any TABD personnel or pass
on a journalist's contact details to a TABD official, although
they did confirm their presence there. No press releases were
issued or any other visible presence of the TABD. Any presence in
Seattle would have likely involved members of the Global Issues
group of the TABD which focuses primarily on the WTO.
Singing in the Corporate Choir
UNICE, the ESN, and the TABD, represented some of the most
significant European corporate lobby groups active in and around
the 3rd Ministerial Meeting of the WTO. Others, such as the
European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC), also threw their
voices in support of a comprehensive new round. [13]
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the International
Council on Metals and the Environment (ICME -- representing
the mining industry), Information Technology Industry Council,
the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and the International
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations, also
urged the Ministers to begin new negotiations in a comprehensive
round.
The US industry groups with a visible presence in Seattle
included the US Grains Council, the Alliance for Better Foods,
the National Food Processors Association, the Farm Bureau, US
Chamber of Commerce, the US Council for International Business
("Giving business a seat at the table in promoting an open system
of world trade, finance, and investment.") and the Biotechnology
Industry Organization.
To Be Continued...
As reported in previous issues of the Corporate Europe Observer,
[14] much of the corporate lobbying activity in the runup to a
WTO Ministerial takes place months and sometimes years before
official negotiations commence. While this continues to be the
case, the rallying cry of UNICE to better coordinate corporate
lobby efforts in order to 'counteract' the efforts of NGOs did
not go unheard. Industry groups were present in full force,
clamouring for attention, meeting with delegates, exchanging
information, and working with the media.
Critique of the corporate influence over WTO negotiations was
central in the mass protests which took place all over the world.
With the failure of the MAI and now Seattle hanging over their
heads, industry will be stepping up its efforts even more as
services and agriculture, together representing over 80% of total
global economic activity, will be negotiated in the WTO in 2000.
[15]
-----
Notes
-----
1. Hudig, Dirk. "Seattle: an opportunity not to be missed" article
appearing in "The European Union in 2000", published by the
European Voice in association with Adamson BSMG Worldwide.
Page 30.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. "European business is aware that free access to markets for
investment is not a realistic short-term objective for
WTO. The investment agreement envisaged should nevertheless
introduce the first welcome steps in this direction." UNICE
and the WTO Millennium Round, Page 15.
5. "Like other WTO agreements, the agreement on treatment of
foreign direct investment should not only be accepted by
all WTO members (with any necessary derogations for
less/least developed countries), but also provide for
periodic review and the possibility of negotiations on
future liberalisation as and when this can be sustained by
WTO members." UNICE and the WTO Millennium Round, Page 16.
6. "Joint Statement by UNICE and Keidanren," Brussels,
November 9, 1999.
7. Sir Leon Brittan, address to the US Coalition of Service
Industries on European strategy for GATS 2000,
Washington DC, September 24th, 1999.
8. "I have been struck by the highly positive response of CEOs
and European services federations and the strong UNICE
support for Sir Leon's call for them to work together to
press the case for further liberalisation in international
trade in services." Andrew Buxton, Chairman Barclays Bank
in an address to the US Coalition of Service Industries on
European strategy for GATS 2000,
Washington DC, September 24th, 1999.
9. European Services Network Set of Principles, 26 January 1999.
10. ESN Position Paper on GATS 2000 and Emergency Safeguard
Measures, 23 April 1999.
11. The Seattle Host Organisation was the primary sponsor of
the event and included some of the largest Fortune 500
companies, and chaired by Microsoft's Bill Gates, and
Boeing's Phil Condit. Major sponsors included Boeing,
Microsoft, Allied Signal, Honeywell, Deloitte & Touche,
US West, General Motors, Nextel, UPS, Ford, Hewlett
Packard, Lucent Technologies, Motorola, United
Technologies, Weyerhauser, AT&T, Bank of America,
Proctor & Gamble, Fed Ex, IBM, Intel, and Chase Manhattan
Bank.
12. See "Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD): Putting the
Business Horse Before the Government Cart". Published by
CEO, October 1999.
13. See "CEFIC Comments on a New Multilateral Trade Round",
<http://www.cefic.org/activities/trade/>
14. See CEObserver, Issue 4, "The WTO Millennium Bug: TNC
Control Over Global Trade Politics", July 1999.
15. See "Business Responses to Seattle" in this issue.
_________________________________________________________________
UPDATE ON THE INVESTMENT NETWORK
HOW THE EC AND BUSINESS PREPARED FOR WTO
INVESTMENT TALKS IN SEATTLE
_________________________________________________________________
In the runup to Seattle, the European Commission coordinated its
campaign for investment negotiations in the WTO with the
Investment Network, an "informal network" of business
representatives initiated by the EC in 1998. [1] Two detailed
surveys were carried out. One among a group of 10,000 EU
companies to identify business expectations of "what
international investment rules should contain." The minutes of
its meetings with the Investment Network (now on the EC's trade
website) leave little doubt about what steers the Commission in
its push for WTO investment negotiations. [2]
To "assist the Commission in tentatively identifying business
priorities" for a WTO investment agreement, the Commission, in
the Spring of 1999, first carried out a questionnaire among the
50 or so large transnational corporations in the Investment
Network. [2] The results of the questionnaire were discussed in
detail with the Investment Network at a meeting on June 23rd. The
EC concluded from the business replies that in comparison with
the OECD's stranded Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI),
the aims of a WTO investment agreement would be less ambitious.
[3] The EC distilled from the questionnaire that accelerated
investment liberalisation and removing performance requirements
(conditions on employing locals, transferring technology,
environmental regulations, etc.), key elements of the MAI, were
no longer such urgent priorities. [4]
During the discussion, members of the Investment Network,
however, distanced themselves from several of the EC's
interpretations and argued for WTO rules with clear MAI features.
"Limitations to the free movement of capital" (such as transfer
of profits) and "discrimination and instability of rules" were
considered problematic, as were limits to foreign ownership and
screening of new investors. [5] Also the EC's conclusion that
"labour and environment standards are not a key factor in a
company's decision to invest" was questioned.
Apart from revealing the EC's eagerness to let business
priorities define its WTO strategies, the minutes also make clear
how the Commission sees business as a key campaign ally. At the
Investment Network meeting last October, the EC complained about
the continued lack of US government support for WTO investment
negotiations. As this 'problem' is mainly due to lack of
enthusiasm by US business, the EC "pointed to the vital need for
increased informal contacts between the EU and US business in
order to push for an investment agenda in Seattle." [6] The
Commission also briefed the Investment Network on the latest
developments in the OECD's review of its "Guidelines on
Multinational Corporations". The Commission wants to keep these
guidelines voluntary, but seems to believe that the process of
revising them can win over some of the NGOs that opposed that
MAI. [7]
Apart from the questionnaire within the Investment Network, the
EC has also commissioned a much bigger so-called 'business
survey' among 10,000 companies. The aim of the business survey is
to "determine the hurdles hindering European companies'
investments outside the EU and to gather their expectations in
terms of what international investment rules should contain." [8]
The results of this survey, carried about by the consultancy
SOFRES, were to be ready just before the Seattle Ministerial, but
have still not been released.
It is high time for Commissioner Lamy to explain how the reality
of EC-initiated business groupings and expensive surveys for
identifying corporate priorities fits with the lofty claims of a
WTO Millennium Round being about 'sustainable development' and
the concerns of the worlds' poorest.
-----
Notes
-----
1. For background information, see CEObserver, Issue 4,
"The WTO Millennium Bug: TNC Control over Global Trade
Politics", CEO, July 1999.
2. The two last meetings of the Investment Network before
the Seattle Ministerial Conference (23 June and 25 October
1999) were attended by between 25 and 35 representatives of
major EU based corporations (including BP, Elf Aquitaine,
ICI, Pechiney, SmithKline Beecham and Unilever). A post-
Seattle meeting of the Investment Network was announced for
early 2000, but does not seem to have taken place yet.
The minutes were only put on the website after repeated
critique from CEO and others: the EC consultations with
NGOs feature prominently on the site, whereas the parallel
process of meetings with the Investment Network, the
European Services Forum and other corporate structures was
largely invisible. The documents related to the Investment
Network are hard to find on the website, but they are worth
looking for:
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/invest/civil.htm>
Note that the minutes are not logically placed in the
section dealing with the "Millennium Round", but elsewhere
on the website. Visitors of the website looking for
information on how the EC is preparing its WTO agenda will,
at the time of this writing, still only see information
about meetings with NGOs.
3. "Short Minutes of the 4th Investment network meeting",
Brussels, 5 October 1999.
4. While the aims would be "very different than those of the
draft MAI," the essential target would however still be to
safeguard and expand investors' 'rights'. Discussion Paper
"Preliminary results of the Business Investment Network
questionnaire", EC, Brussels 23 June 1999.
5. Concerning investment liberalisation, the EC concluded
that the wave of economic deregulation has already done
away with almost all barriers for foreign investors. As for
performance requirements, the WTO TRIMs agreement already
limits the use of such measures and "governments are
gradually dismantling" these measures anyhow, "in their
efforts to attract FDI."
6. "Civil society Consultation on Trade and Investment:
Report," Brussels, 23 June 1999.
7. UNICE replied that parts of US business were already
supporting investment talks to start in Seattle. This
discussion followed after the EC had briefed business on
its meetings with the negotiators from the rest of the Quad
countries (US, Japan and Canada). "Short Minutes of the 4th
Investment Network meeting," Brussels, 5 October 1999.
8. The Commission stressed the role they see for the revised
guidelines "in the prospect of establishing binding rules
on investment in the WTO." Symptomatically, UNICE used the
occasion to protest against one OECD country having
proposed to move away from the purely non-binding status of
the guidelines, which could result in "companies being
dragged in the future in front of quasi-juridical panels of
the OECD." This resistance against binding guidelines or a
'naming and shaming' approach stands in stark contrast to
the lofty claims about their social and environmental
behaviour made by UNICE and European TNCs in general.
"Short Minutes of the 4th Investment Network meeting,"
Brussels, 5 October 1999.
9. "Short Minutes of the 4th Investment Network meeting,"
Brussels, 5 October 1999.
_________________________________________________________________
BUSINESS RESPONSES TO SEATTLE
_________________________________________________________________
"The business community, uncharacteristically silent for much of
the week, was clearly unhappy... My feeling is that,
collectively, you thought that to intervene would be to convince
the world of what the more extreme representatives of civil
society were saying: that business interest amounted to proof
positive that the WTO is a capitalist plot."
-- European Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy about Seattle [1]
Business kept a low public profile during the WTO summit in
Seattle and even more so in the months after, despite their deep
disappointment. Those business groupings that have spoken out
have done their best to downplay the impacts of the failed WTO
Ministerial. While waiting for the troubled waters to get
quieter, business is developing new strategies against the
movements criticising neoliberal globalisation. Think tanks and
the PR industry have stepped in to play a major role in the first
months of post-Seattle corporate politics.
While US industry groups attacked President Clinton for the
Seattle "PR disaster," [2] European business continues to build
its cosy relations with the European Commission. Straight after
Seattle, George Jacobs, President of the European employers
confederation, UNICE, praised Commissioner Lamy for his
"leadership role to build bridges between different WTO member
views and ensure transparency by involving representatives of
civil society in the EU delegation." [3] UNICE, which has seven
working groups on the WTO, continues to work in tandem with the
EC to garner support for a WTO Millennium Round. Nothing less
than a comprehensive round, including new issues like investment
and government procurement, is acceptable to UNICE, stating that
"a limited package is not worth it for European business." [4]
In contrast to UNICE, the International Chamber of Commerce's
(ICC) post-Seattle strategy remains opposed to addressing
environment and labour issues in the WTO. [5] The ICC has been
the international business group responding most prominently
after Seattle, vehemently downplaying the importance of the
failed summit. The group´s claims that the failed Ministerial has
not brought trade liberalisation to a halt. Emphasising that
trade negotiations in the past have often survived temporary
setbacks, the ICC believes that a comprehensive round is still
possible, "as negotiations resume next year in a more serene
atmosphere in Geneva." [6] The ICC wants business to take a lead
in convincing public opinion to support trade liberalisation and
sees a role for itself in the offensive against WTO critics, who
they describe as "highly organised and sophisticated groups that
for many different reasons are hostile to trade." [7]
Far more conciliatory were the post-Seattle sound-bytes coming
out of the World Economic Forum [8] in January. From the Davos
podium, influential leaders and prominent speakers expressed
their understanding for the concerns of WTO critics and argued
for reforms and more inclusive forms of 'global governance'.
The European Policy Centre, an influential Brussels-based
think tank, provided a forum for industry to debate and
reflect on their failings in Seattle. [9] During a number of
meetings for EPC members, the Seattle events were
evaluated and plans were made to bring the Millennium
Round back on track. According to Craig Burchell, from
Philips and also chairing the EPC's WTO Forum, the anti-
WTO campaigns are ignorant and media exaggerates their
importance. [10] The EPC's main advice to the corporate
world is to improve communication strategies. Corporations
should "take a more proactive position in relation to trade
liberalisation" and find better ways of "dealing with the new
breed of NGOs." [11] The EPC recommends business to
"provide funding" for organising public debates to improve
public perception of globalisation and transnational
corporations and to "curb the activities of extremist NGOs."
[12] That happens to be exactly the kind of services offered
by the European Policy Centre, which has already grown out
to be one of the most active corporate think-tanks currently
operating in Brussels.
The public affairs industry is also eager to assist in
communicating the corporate trade and investment agenda. Global
PR giant, Edelman, offers to assist corporations with "EU and WTO
Public Affairs, Media Relations and Crisis Preparedness." [13]
Washington-based PR company Black, Kelly, Scruggs & Healy
recently sent its corporate clients a "Guide to the Seattle
Meltdown: A Compendium of Activists at the WTO Ministerial." [14]
In an accompanying letter, the companies managing director warns
against the "potential ability of the emerging coalition of these
groups to seriously impact broader, longer-term corporate
interests." The director ends his introduction of the report,
that describes 48 WTO-critical groups, with advertising his
company's capability "to defend clients against attacks" from
these groups. [15]
-----
Notes
-----
1. Speech at the European Institute, Washington, 17
February 2000
2. According to Harry L Freeman (Coalition of Service
Industries) Clinton had not been vocal enough in his
support for trade liberalisation. "US Business See
Ministerial as a Setback for Trade Liberalisation",
International Trade Reporter, 9 December 1999.
3. UNICE press release, George Jacobs, UNICE President,
"UNICE Reacts on WTO Seattle Deadlock: No Results Better
Than Bad Result", Brussels, 7 December 1999.
4. Ibid.
5. Drawing lessons from the lost battle around the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), UNICE is
willing to accept social and environmental clauses in the
WTO in the hope to get NGOs to agree on a WTO Millennium
Round. See "The WTO Millennium Bug", CEObserver Issue 4,
June 1999.
6. ICC President Adnan Kassar, "Seattle setback will not hit
trade liberalisation", The Hindu Business Line,
10 December 1999.
7. See also "Davos 2000: 'New Beginnings' for Global
Capitalism?" in this issue.
8. See also CEObserver, Issues 2 and 3.
9. "They know how to exploit the internet to coordinate their
lobbying and are adept at winning media attention."
10. A personal report on the Seattle Ministerial by Craig
Burchell (Senior Trade Representative of Philips
Electronics, and Chairman of the EPC's WTO Forum):
"The Seattle Ministerial: What Happened", 30 Nov - 3 Dec
1999. Posted on EPC website:
<www.theepc.be/Challenge_Europe/Forums_Notes/WTO/Seattle.htm>
N.B. In 1997, when Philips CEO Jan Timmer was TABD EU
chair, his sherpa, Craig Burchell, was co-chair of the TABD
Steering Committee.
11. Ibid.
12. Stanley Crossick, EPC Chairman, "Seattle: The Business
Fall-Out", 23 December 1999.
<www.theepc.be/Challenge_Europe/Communications/Seattle2.htm>
13. Edelman Europe advertisement in the European Voice,
24 February - 1 March 2000, page 26.
14. This guide by Black, Kelly, Scruggs & Healy, cover letter
dated January 14 2000 was leaked to activists and posted
on the "N30" anti-WTO email list. The report seems the
result of a few hours of visiting websites of a fairly
random selection of groups that campaigned against the WTO
Millennium Round.
15. Ibid.
_________________________________________________________________
DAVOS 2000: 'NEW BEGINNINGS' FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM?
_________________________________________________________________
The air was full of 'Seattle' when some 2,000 industrialists,
politicians and other self-proclaimed 'global leaders' met for
the 30th World Economic Forum (WEF), in the Swiss ski resort,
Davos, in January. The international media eagerly speculated
whether the anti-WEF demonstration organised by Swiss anti-WTO
activists would turn into a 'second Seattle'. The perceived
backlash against globalisation and how to respond to it was one
of the main themes of this years' forum, along with the internet
'e-conomy'.
As neoliberal economist and WEF veteran, Paul Krugman, recently
put it, the 'Davos Man' has "an image problem. One that threatens
the process of the globalisation for which they stand." [1]
Conveniently, the WEF is all about promoting new common
discourses for the global elite, including joint responses to
whatever challenges they might face. Not only to give the
assembled politicians and corporate elite a pleasant feeling of
common direction, [2] but also to get the message distributed
around the world through the international mega-media which was
well represented in Davos. The discourse emanating from the
carefully orchestrated debates and workshops of this year's WEF
is that globalisation is the only viable strategy, but needs a
'human face'. Markets should be liberalised and globalised, but
this should be combined with self-regulation and philanthropy by
business and a more consensus-seeking model of 'global
governance', including developing country governments and
'constructive' NGOs. This, in short, is the WEF's post-Seattle
recipe to make neoliberal globalisation a more palatable
development model. [3]
The WEF organisers, lead by Klaus Schwab, showed how experienced
they are in selling new images to the world. In the days before
the start of the Davos events, articles by Schwab and WEF
Director Schmadja appeared in international newspapers and
magazines warning against the backlash caused by "globalization
running amok." [4] After the internal disputes between North and
South at the WTO Ministerial in Seattle, Schwab and Smadja called
for a more inclusive approach and for "new multilateral
structures for global governance" with enough credibility and
legitimacy." [5] Schwab proposed "close cooperation between
government, business and civil society" and for "flexible
networks, where you put together governments, international
organizations and business to look at the new issues on the
global agenda." [6] Smadja in another article argued that in
order to prevent the backlash, "social, psychological and ethical
dimensions must be integrated into the globalization process."
[7] After last year's slogan, 'Responsible Globality', the
organisers must have really stretched their minds to come up with
the even more feel-good title "New Beginnings: Making a
Difference" -- quite a jump from the undiluted neoliberal slogans
of earlier years, like the 1996 slogan -- "Strengthening
Globalisation."
'Davos Men' About 'Seattle People'
Political leaders like Tony Blair and Bill Clinton in their WEF
speeches, paid lip- service to what they generously described as
legitimate concerns of the Seattle demonstrators, but continued
to defend the launch of a new WTO round to achieve further trade
liberalisation. [8] Clinton stated that "trade can no longer be
the private province of politicians, CEOs and trade experts," an
ironic message in light of the elitist audience he was
addressing. 1,200 business leaders were present there, all from
companies with a minimum turnover of US$1 billion and each having
paid a personal entry fee of typically US$20,000. Clinton asked
the business leaders to "develop a joint vision for the next
10-20 years," but not to "leave the little people out." [9]
Mexican president Zedillo launched a fierce attack on the
WTO-critics, who he accused of suffering from "globaphobia" and
only wanting to prevent economic development in the South. [10]
Among the speakers from business, some played 'good cop', others
'bad cop'. Louis Schweitzer of Renault warned that " a purely
free-market economy is like allowing a fox free into the
henhouse." [11] Lewis B. Campbell, CEO of Textron, called
"supporters of free trade" to build an international coalition
sufficient to push the cause of globalisation," in order not to
loose "the propaganda war... The international business community
must take the lead,", said Campbell, who referred to NAFTA, which
happened because business mobilised for it. [12]
Also a part of the post-Seattle image-building was the handful of
workshops on corporate social and environmental accountability
that took place during the WEF. Time Magazine and Newsweek (with
strong financial links to the WEF) in their previews on Davos
focused on how corporations respond to consumer pressure and want
to be seen as 'good global citizens'. [13] Time Magazine printed
a full-page appeal by ABB's CEO Goran Lindahl, prominent WEF
participant but himself responsible for serious corporate abuses,
for TNCs to "make protecting human rights a priority." [14]
Journalist Will Hutton of the London Observer who attended the
WEF was not impressed, noting that the workshops on business
ethics tended to be poorly attended. "The 'hard' conversations
are about how to maximise shareholder value and how to be a
winner in the new economy," he concluded. [15] Despite the many
gestures to signal change (like planting trees to compensate for
the CO2 emissions involved in flying the 'Davos Men' in) Hutton
saw little real change. "The balloon of complacency and belief
that the Davos consensus is almost unimprovable is so huge that
it would take an intellectual atom bomb along with gigantic riots
to effect any change." [16]
The messages from the WEF were transmitted to the outside world
through the 650 journalists that were allowed to cover the event.
WEF media participants are not only meticulously selected
(alternative media is not welcome and journalists who have
criticised the WEF are rarely invited again), most of them only
have restricted access and base their reports on "reams of
handouts, session summaries and the snatches of the proceedings
they watched on live, closed-circuit TV," in the words of Danny
Schlechter of the media-critical Media Channel. [17] Luxurious
dinners paid for by Coca-Cola were to keep these media workers
happy. [18]
A Seat at the Table in Davos?
Another move to improve the image of the 'Davos Man' was to
invite NGO representatives, some of which are known as 'Seattle
people'. While Schwab has already for some years handpicked a
handful of leaders of mainstream global NGOs such as Greenpeace
and Amnesty International, the presence of Martin Khor and
Vandana Shiva of Third World Network was the result of demands by
the NGO initiative 'Public Eye on Davos'. This project to
"monitor the World Economic Forum" was setup by the Swiss Berne
Declaration and supported by over 150 NGOs who signed a joint
statement. [19] 'Public Eye on Davos' demanded the WEF to
"radically change its perspectives, rules and proceedings,"
improve transparency and increase NGO participation. [20] WEF
boss Klaus Schwab responded by inviting six NGO people from a
list of 20 candidates and accepting an invitation for a public
debate. [21]
In the debate, Schwab was full of praise for the NGOs, stating
that "dialogue is what Davos is all about." [22] The WEF, Schwab
claimed, is "the only platform in the world that can look at all
challenges and ensure an integrated view." Not everybody is
welcome, however. When asked about the demands made by 'Public
Eye on Davos' and whether he would double the number of NGO
participants next year, Schwab replied that only "people who can
make a conceptual presentation" and have "capacity for dialogue"
would be invited. [23] These are the kinds of people which Schwab
sees playing a role in the "global policy networks" between
governments, business and NGOs he envisages can deliver
legitimacy and consensus for 'responsible globalisation' and
'global governance'. Inside the WEF, there were several workshops
looking at the role of NGOs and how business should respond to
the increased scrutiny from campaign groups. [24]
Several journalists at the press conference of the 'Public Eye on
Davos' asked critical questions about the 'Public Eye on Davos'
strategy of reforming and democratising the WEF. Is a democratic
WEF imaginable? Were the NGOs taking part in the WEF not being
co-opted and did their participation not dilute the critical
message? Walden Bello, one of the NGO representatives who
experienced the WEF from the inside, afterwards concluded, "we
should not try to reform Davos, but we should expose and ridicule
and challenge the dangerous and undemocratic self-importance of
Davos and the people who go there." [25] This mirrors the opinion
of the estimated 2,000 demonstrators, mainly from Switzerland,
France and Italy, who managed to take over the central streets of
Davos for most of an afternoon despite a massive police and
military presence. [26] Their protest was not for increased NGO
participation but against global elites meeting to chart out the
future for the rest of the world -- regardless of how "committed
to improving the state of the world" these 'global leaders' claim
to be. [27]
-----
Notes
-----
1. "'Davos Man' Needs to Resolve an Image Problem",
International Herald Tribune, January 24th, 2000. Krugman's
'Davos Man' image captures very well the extreme gender
bias of the event: this year more than 90% of the
participants were men. The Swiss Wochenzeitung noted that
also the group of six NGO participants at the WEF selected
by 'Public Eye on Davos' was male dominated, with five men
and one woman. "Wirtschaftsforum: Es geht nicht nur um
Oekonomie", Wochenzeitung 3 February 2000.
2. For many participants, an important part of going to Davos
is the informal talks and the deal-making which takes place
elsewhere in the conference centre and in hotel lobbies. A
Swiss CEO claimed to have planned more than twenty smaller
meetings in the three days he was in Davos. Being able to
meet so many corporate and political leaders in such a
short time saves weeks of travel time. One of the reasons
for corporations to pay the additional US$200,000 and
become "WEF Partners" is to be the first to receive the
full final list of WEF participants: crucial privilege for
the intense race of making the most worthwhile appointments
for the 5-day event. "Scharf Beobachtete Begegnungen",
Wochenzeitung, 30 January 2000.
3. The five days of World Economic Forum featured some
350 workshops, including titles such as:
- "Is Globalisation for Everybody?",
- "Strategies to Fight the Globalisation Trap",
- "It's Not the Economy, It's the Society",
- "Global governance in the 21st Century".
4. "We Need Structures to Help Steer Globalization", Klaus
Schwab and Claude Smadja, International Herald Tribune,
24 January 2000.
5. Ibid.
6. "The world is so complex that we cannot create some kind of
all-encompassing business-government organization. It would
lack democratic legitimacy."
WEF website: <http://worldeconomicforum.org/>
7. Tony Blair stressed the need to win over "the sincere and
well-motivated opponents of the WTO agenda." Source:
"That's snowbizz", Financial Times, 29 January 2000.
8. As the last speaker in a plenary debate about international
trade, Zedillo was given three times as long to speak as
the other speakers and his speech was distributed in
printed format by WEF hostesses. Die Weltwoche, 3 Feb 2000.
9. WEF press release 29 January 2000.
10. Clinton responded to Schwab's question on what he
most wanted to ask the 1,000 most powerful CEOs who
were in the room. Clinton also told the business leaders
that "when good people have a shared vision, all works
well. Collectively, you can change the world."
11. Ibid.
12. "It's the Society, Stupid," Time Magazine, 31 January 2000.
13. "Ubiquity and its Burdens," Newsweek, 31 January 2000.
14. "A New Role for Global Businesses," Time Magazine,
31 January 2000. ABB specialises in building and running
nuclear, fossil fuel and hydroelectric power plants around
the world. Particularly controversial is ABB's involvement
in the planned Three Gorges Project in China and the Bakun
Dam in Malaysia (now postponed), both of which would result
in massive forced resettlement of local people.
15. According to Hutton, "the voices arguing that corporations
need to behave ethically, and socially responsible and with
an eye on environmental sustainability are the weakest in
the weakest in the 11 years I have been coming here."
Source: "Greed is Good, Too Good to be True", Will Hutton,
The Observer, 30 January 2000.
16. Ibid.
17. The WEF has a strict hierarchy of badges and only few
correspondents with a name get the 'all access' white
badges and are full participants of the Forum. A category
higher is the group of editors and columnists with the
label "media leaders" who take part in panel debates.
Finally, a whole different clan are Rupert Murdoch, Michael
Bloomberg and other CEOs of media corporations who were in
Davos to promote their business. "At the Top Of the World:
Covering the World Economic Forum -- How the Goliaths of
Globalization Groom the Media", Danny Schechter,
3 February 2000, <www.mediachannel.org>
18. Ibid. There was also a special media dinner with US
trade negotiator Charlene Barshefsky and US Treasury
Secretary Larry Summers.
19. See website of the 'Public Eye on Davos'
<http://www.evb.ch/>
20. The 'Public Eye on Davos' NGO Statement.
21. The other four were Walden Bello, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz,
Brent Blackwelder and Manuel Chiriboga. Other NGO
representatives at this year's WEF included David Bryer of
Oxfam, Ed Mayo of the New Economics Foundation, Kenneth
Roth of Human Rights Watch and Pierre Sane of Amnesty
International. Trade unions were represented by John J.
Sweeney (AFL-CIO), Bill Jordan (ICFTU), John Monks (TUC),
Emilio Gabaglio (ETUC) and others.
22. Public debate organised by 'Public Eye on Davos',
29 January 2000.
23. Ibid. Some of the NGOs invited for the WEF seem to have
strong confidence in Schwab's capacity to select.
Greenpeace CEO Thilo Bode, who spoke at four WEF panels,
even distanced himself from the Public Eye initiative.
"People who have something to say will also be invited,"
Bode told a Swiss newspaper. "Draussen, drinnen, auf der
Strasse," Die Weltwoche, 3 February 2000.
24. Including workshops titled:
- "In Search of Robin Hood",
- "NGO: Foes or Partners in the Global Agenda?",
- "A New Big Brother is Watching You: What the Grassroots
NGO is Thinking".
25. Focus on Trade, Number 45, February 2000.
26. The regional authorities had banned the demonstration and
only few had expected that the police would let people
move away from the station square. After walking a
kilometre or so down the main street the police blocked the
street with their vans and fences. On the way, a McDonalds
branch had its windows smashed and a huge McDonalds banner
was taken down from a wall and burned. It had an image of a
hamburger and the provoking slogan: "Think Globally, Eat
Locally".
27. "The World Economic Forum is an independent organization
committed to improving the state of the world." The WEF
about itself on <http://www.worldeconomicforum.org/>
_________________________________________________________________
TOOTHLESS UN WEBSITE ON GLOBAL COMPACT WITH TNCS
_________________________________________________________________
On the 28th of January, the UN launched a website on its
controversial 'Global Compact' with major transnational
corporations. [1] Since its launch last year, the Global Compact
has been criticised for giving corporations a free ride, by being
able to use this UN seal of approval to improve their public
image, without corresponding tangible changes in their overall
corporate social, environmental or human rights behaviour. The
new website confirms this picture. Even the previously announced
pledges by corporations, which were to be posted on the website
to allow monitoring by NGOs, are absent.
The Global Compact consists of a list of very general principles
for corporate social, environmental and human rights behaviour.
The UN in return commits to support the business agenda for
continued moves towards global "free trade". The Compact is not
binding and lacks any real enforcement and monitoring mechanisms.
In July 1999, the UN told the international media that a
UN-sponsored website would be launched to present "the specific
pledges made by multinational corporations and allow independent
aid groups and non-governmental organisations to publicly
challenge companies if they do not abide by the substance of
these pledges." [2] The launch of the website -- the only
concrete element of the Global Compact -- was to happen in the
Autumn (an ILO conference in early November was one of the missed
deadlines), but it was postponed time and again. [3]
When the website was launched in January, the promised references
to individual corporations or pledges they have made were
painfully absent. This undoubtedly has to do with the fact that
as of this writing, no individual corporation has committed
itself to the Global Compact, despite its non- binding character.
The corporate partners mentioned on the website are all business
associations, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development
(WBCSD). Their 'partnership' has no binding effects for the
individual corporations which are members of these groupings. [4]
NGO partners include Amnesty International, World Wide Fund for
Nature , Human Rights Watch, the World Resources Institute and
three other lesser known groups. [5] The International
Confederation of Free Trade Union's (ICFTU) is also involved,
representing labour. For the rest, the website consists of the
text of the Global Compact, a selective overview of academic
literature on globalisation and on industry self-regulation as
well as a news section with media reports on corporate
accountability issues.
The UN website was launched at the occasion of the World Economic
Forum (WEF), the annual gathering of the global business and
political elite in Davos, Switzerland where UN Secretary General
Annan also first proposed the Global Compact a year earlier. [6]
This year, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson
was present at the WEF, taking part in a debate about business
and human rights. [7]
The UN website came almost three months after the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) launched its own website on the Global
Compact. The ICC website consists of a collection of reports on
various isolated environmental and human rights initiatives by
the likes of BP-Amoco, Fiat, Unilever and other corporations that
are involved in the ICC. While the ICC is eagerly using the
Global Compact to promote a positive image of transnational
corporate behaviour, it remains strongly opposed to enforceable
rules, claiming that self-regulation will make its members
responsible 'global corporate citizens'.
'Citizens Compact': Enforceable UN Rules for Corporate Behaviour
On the same day as the UN Global Compact website was announced, a
"Citizens Compact on the UN and Corporations" was launched. More
than 100 organisations from North and South have signed on to
this statement, which is a fundamental critique of the Global
Compact. Instead of 'partnership' between the UN and corporations
(among which many have controversial social and environmental
records) the Citizens Compact demands that the UN develops
internationally enforceable rules for corporate behaviour.
To sign on to the Citizens Compact on the UN and
Corporations, please visit <http://www.corpwatch.org/>
The UN's website on the Global Compact can be found at
<http://www.unglobalcompact.org/>
For the ICC's Global Compact website, go to
<http://www.iccwbo.org/>
-----
Notes
-----
1. See Corporate Europe Observer, Issue 5 for background.
2. Business Backs Trade Role for UN. The Guardian, 6 July
1999.
3. 4 November 1999 in Geneva at the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) Enterprise Forum. Letter from Jessica
Jiji, UN Information Officer, 24 September 1999.
4. Apart from the ICC and the WBCSD, also the International
Organisation of Employers (IOE) and eight other business
associations are official Global Compact partners. Other
business partners include Business for Social
Responsibility (BSR), the Conference Board, the Prince of
Wales Business Leaders Forum (PWBLF), the European Business
Network for Social Cohesion (EBNSC), the International
Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Agency
(IPIECA), Enterprises pour l'Environnement, the
International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC)
and the International Fertiliser Industry Association (IFA).
5. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Ethod and Fundaçăo
Abrinq pelos Direitos da Criança.
6. For more on the World Economic Forum, see the article
"Davos 2000: 'New Beginnings' for Global Capitalism?",
elsewhere in this issue.
7. UNHCR used the WEF to present its new paper "Business
and Human Rights: A Progress Report", see
<http://www.unchr.ch/>
UN-BUSINESS 'PARTNERSHIPS' UPDATE
The Citizens' Compact on the UN and Corporations rejects the idea
of 'partnership' between UN agencies and corporations and
outlines some strict criteria to avoid inappropriate joint
projects between the UN and business. The need for such rules
once again became clear when the news broke about a new
UN-business body called the Business Humanitarian Forum (BHF).
The Geneva-based BHF brings together UN institutions and
corporations, many with a poor social and environmental record.
Its first meeting in January 1999, in a luxury hotel in Geneva,
was "to focus on ways to improve communication and cooperation
between global corporations and humanitarian organisations in
their common efforts to promote the stability and well-being of
countries likely to be affected or affected by conflict and
natural disaster." [1]
The BHF is co-chaired by UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) Sadako Ogata and John Imle President of UNOCAL, an oil
company known for human rights violations in Burma. Also UNICEF
is in the BHF, with Nestlé, a company stubbornly continuing to
violate the UN's code of conduct on infant formula -- the
International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes.
Suez-Lyonnnaise des Eaux, Rio Tinto and ICI are other
controversial corporate members, not to speak of United
Technologies Corporation, the largest military contractor in the
world. This did not seem to disturb Kofi Annan, who sent an
encouraging message to the founding meeting of the BHF, stressing
the UN's newly found positive attitude to business. [2] NGOs
involved in the BHF include the International Rescue Committee,
Save the Children, Care USA and the Red Cross. [3]
In September, the Transnational Resource and Action Centre (TRAC)
and numerous other groups called on UN High Commissioner for
Refugees Sadako Ogata and UNICEF Executive Director Carol Bellamy
to resign from the BHF. [4] Protests against joint UN-business
projects can be effective, as was shown when the UNDP put its
Global Sustainable Development Facility (GSDF) in the freezer.
[5] The UNDP decided for 'a review' of the project after
continued critique by a global coalition of groups led by TRAC.
For more information, check TRAC's Corporate Watch website:
<http://www.corpwatch.org/>
-----
Notes
-----
1. UN press release "Business-Humanitarian Forum holds first
meeting," Geneva, Switzerland, 27 January 1999.
2. "The United Nations has developed a profound appreciation
for the role of the private sector: its expertise, its
innovative spirit, its unparalleled ability to create jobs
and wealth," Annan wrote. The Secretary-General, Message to
the Business Humanitarian Forum, Geneva, 27 January 1999.
3. BHF participants' list.
4. TRAC press release, 23 September 1999, "Groups Expose
More United Nations Affiliations with Corporate Predators."
5. See CEObserver, Issue 3 for background on the GDSF.
_________________________________________________________________
GUIDE TO 'GERMANY, INC.'
_________________________________________________________________
"Germany Inc., the protective net of cross-shareholdings and
government regulations that has long shielded the country from
the cruel tide of globalisation, is dead." [1]
Business Week, 21 February 2000
Relations between business and politics in Germany has been
international news in the last months. This is not only because
of the illegal business donations which have brought the
Christian Democratic party into a deep crisis, but also the
political controversy around the hostile take-over of Mannesmann
AG by UK-based Vodaphone and the government rescue plan for the
crisis-ridden Holzmann corporation. [2] The Financial Times
describes the hostile take-over of Mannesmann AG (the first of
its kind in Germany and much criticised by German trade unions,
politicians and media) as "a landmark in Germany's momentous
journey towards a different model of capitalism." [3] Due to
economic globalisation and the single currency, "the rules of the
post-war German settlement between capital and labour are being
radically rewritten from the outside," the newspaper continued,
"to the advantage of shareholders." [4] Wim Duisenberg, president
of the European Central Bank, lead the choir criticising the
Schröder government's rescue of Holzmann AG (and thousands of
jobs) as the last twitching of old-fashioned government
interference in the workings of global market forces. Duisenberg
even accused Schröder of being co- responsible for the declining
rate of the euro as the government intervention "does not enhance
the image that we want to have of being an increasingly
market-driven economy across the euro area." [5]
A timely and illuminating guide to "Germany, Inc." and the social
and political impacts of its ongoing transformation is
Johann-Gunther König's book "Alle Macht den Konzerne -- Das
neue Europa im Griff der Lobbyisten" ("All Power to the
Corporations -- the New Europe in the Grip of the Lobbyists"),
released in April 1999 by the German publisher Rowohlt. While
focusing on the recent changes, König's book is far from
nostalgic. It starts with an overview of the history of
corporate Germany, including the support of German industry
(but also US corporations) for the nazi regime. [7] In his
portrait of post-war German industry, König describes the
outrageous degree of concentration of economic power in the
hands of a small number of corporations and individuals. Major
German corporations and banks own large blocks of each others
shares and it is common for German industrialists to be in the
advisory boards of a number of other, 'competing' corporations.
Particularly the powerful role of Deutsche Bank through its
ownership of large parts of many of the largest German
corporations is astonishing.
Economic globalisation has made the concept of 'German' companies
a more and more diffuse one. Companies headquartered in Germany,
such as DaimlerChrysler, BASF, Bayer, have grown out to be some
of the largest 'global players'. [8] Production and sales in
Germany is becoming less and less important for these
corporations, who can shift production from one place to another
in search for the most profitable investment climate and access
new markets around the world. Ownership is internationalising
rapidly too, as particularly US and UK investors buy up shares.
The growing power of US and UK investors increases the pressure
for higher and higher returns to shareholders. [9] The pursuit of
'shareholder value', König shows, has made German corporations
accelerate downsizing and relocation to lower-cost countries and
led to worsened working conditions (longer working hours,
increased work pressure, etc.). König strongly warns against the
new corporate culture and its ideal of the 'flexible' (but
essentially conformist) human being, always ready to adapt to the
demands of both the markets and those holding political power
(captured well by König in the untranslatable German term
"leistungsbewuste mitlaufer").
König describes how the empowerment of the markets has caused a
growing social crisis in Germany. Profits and CEO salaries are
skyrocketing, while the pressure on wages is downwards. [10] The
employees' share of total income has never been lower in the
history of the German federal republic, while capital has
increased its share from 24% in 1980 to 40% in 1997. Because of
business-friendly tax policies and tax evasion, corporations
bring in only 15% of the total tax income, against 25% 20 years
ago.
One of the main causes behind the accelerated competition and
downwards pressure on corporate taxes, working conditions and
social protection in Germany and the rest of the EU, König
argues, is the European single market. König describes the
increased concentration of economic power in virtually all
sectors of the new European economy (supermarkets, tourism,
media, banking, computers, etc.). A result of the intense race to
attract foreign investments is the emergence of free trade zones
(such as New Park near Munich), a phenomena until recently known
mainly from Central America and East Asia.
König concludes that corporate political power has reached
unprecedented levels, both in Germany and on the European Union
level. Almost 1,700 professional lobbyists are registered in the
German capital Bonn (now Berlin), but their activities are only
the tip of the iceberg of corporate involvement in German
politics. One third of all German MPs have side jobs with
interest groups and 'revolving doors' between politics and
industry is commonplace in Germany.
The ongoing transfer of decision-making to Brussels does not make
things better, König argues. He presents numerous examples of how
German industry has promoted its interests through the
'bureaucratic-industrial complex' in Brussels, in which the
European Commission plays a key role and particularly the
extremely industry-friendly Directorate- General III (previously
industry, now enterprise). König sees the lack of critical media
monitoring Brussels, the absence of a European public debate and
the understaffed European Commission as the main reasons for the
excessive power of lobbyists in EU decision-making.
While it would not in itself be a problem if the old nation
states would disappear, the way it happens is disastrous.
Democratic decision-making is increasingly crowded out by market
forces and governments face growing problems with regulating
corporations. The crucial question, König concludes, is how to
re-empower social movements. He calls for a 'second struggle for
democracy', this time on the global level, but has most of his
hopes set on the revival of the trade union movement on the
European level. In light of his sharp critique of corporate power
in Germany and Europe, König is surprisingly uncritical of the
euro-corporatist European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) which
has failed to confront neoliberal policies of the EU throughout
the 90's. König also fails to mention more inspiring new
initiatives like the European marches against unemployment and
poverty and other international activist solidarity networks.
König's book contains a wealth of essential analysis, but a
comprehensive agenda for rolling back corporate power is
unfortunately lacking.
-----
Notes
-----
1. "Auf Wiedersehen, Germany Inc.", Business Week,
21 February 2000.
2. Bankruptcy seemed unavoidable for the large construction
company Holzmann AG, but the Schröder government saved
it in November 1999 with a rescue package of DM 2.3
billion. UK-based Vodafone took over the high-tech company
Mannesmann AG in order to get its profitable D-2 cell-phone
network, while planning to sell off the rest off the
company. German newspapers protested that "thousands of
jobs are destroyed, just because international investors
want to make a short-term profit" (Die Welt, quoted in Wall
Street Journal Europe, 22 November 1999). Chancellor
Schröder stated that "hostile take-overs are never
helpful," but the take-over proceeded (Wall Street Journal
Europe, 22 November 1999).
3. "Whirlwinds of change," February 2000.
4. Ibid.
5. Wall Street Journal Europe, 7 December 1999.
6. "Auf Wiedersehen, Germany Inc.", Business Week, 21 February
2000. "German companies now have to compete in Europe's
huge, single capital market," increasing the "pressure to
maximise returns."
7. Ford and General Motors gave financial and technological
support to the Nazis and continued producing from factories
in Germany during the Second World War.
8. Siemens is active in over 150 countries and has German-
speaking staff in more countries than there are German
embassies and consulates.
9. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, shareholders returns are
traditionally substantially higher than in Germany and
other European countries.
10. Whereas corporate profits doubled between 1980 and 1997,
the net income of German employees grew only 1.5%.
_________________________________________________________________
CEO HOSTS MEETING IN SPAIN
_________________________________________________________________
Corporate Europe Observatory hosted its first-ever gathering of
campaigners, researchers and journalists working on the subject
of corporate power from the 15th to the 17th of October 1999.
Most of the participants were interested not only in the economic
impacts of large corporations, but also in political power and
access to various national and international decision-makers and
institutions by TNCs. The meeting, entitled 'European Strategy
Session on Corporate Power', was organised by the Spanish
contingent of CEO and took place in the beautiful Andalusian city
of Córdoba.
Kicking Off
The first day of the meeting was spent setting up a framework for
discussions with examples of various manifestations of corporate
power, in particular in the political realm. Several case studies
on the role of large corporations in different European countries
were presented. Axel Koehler-Schnura from the German Critical
Shareholders organisation and Coordination Against Bayer-Dangers
explained the sordid history of the German chemical industry and
its current intimate relationship with the government. Tarjei
Leer-Salvesen from Norwatch described the situation in Norway,
where a large percentage of industry is state-owned and
corporate CEOs are often appointed by the government. Juraj
Zamokovsky from the Centre for Environmental Public
Advocacy/Friends of the Earth Slovakia related the polarisation
in his country between old-style communists and free-market
supporters, who are associated with democracy and have greater
public support.
Corporate power on the European Union level was the next subject
taken up. Mikael Nyberg from Sweden provided a history of
corporate lobby groups in the EU, beginning with the influential
European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), and described the
intimate relationship between corporate CEOs and Brussels
decision-makers. In the following discussion, examples were given
of lobby efforts conducted by industrial sectors including the
automobile, pharmaceutical, fisheries and oil industries, and the
work of the public relations sector on their behalf.
CEO's own Erik Wesselius delved into the Transatlantic Business
Dialogue as an example of an influential corporate- state
alliance. This alliance between EU and US industries and
governments is geared towards the creation of a transatlantic
marketplace by the elimination of barriers to trade. Juan López
de Uralde of Greenpeace International pointed out that the TABD
was responsible for killing an EU directive on the banning of
toys made of toxic PVC materials, and that the Business Dialogue
is interested not only in defeating technical measures but also
in eliminating pro- environment guidelines such as the
precautionary principle.
Tony Clarke from the Polaris Institute in Canada and Antonio
Tujan from the IBON Foundation in the Philippines presented the
World Trade Organisation as an example of an institution that
reinforces corporate power. Tony explained how the WTO is a
corporate-driven process, with a strong symbiosis between
business and state in each of the four main driving political
blocs behind the institution (the EU, the US, Japan and Canada).
The defeated Multilateral Agreement on Investment was given as
another example of a corporate-led initiative to secure
investment rights for TNCs in developing countries. Antonio
exploded some of the myths surrounding free trade, pointing out
that two-thirds of world trade is between corporations. The
ensuing discussion covered issues ranging from the attachment of
social and environmental clauses to trade agreements (it was felt
that this only enhances corporate power) and corporate codes of
conduct (which are often only 'window dressing' for TNCs to
appear more responsible).
Ramón Fernández Durán from the Spanish Ecologistas in Acción
provided an explanation of how markets are deregulated via the
International Monetary Fund and how financial institutions and
TNCs profit from this arrangement. The ensuing discussion touched
on issues including the proposed creation of a private sector
advisory board to the IMF and the importance of targeting
investment and pension funds in our campaigns.
Next, Judith Richter, Claudia Peter and Eveline Lubbers addressed
the subject of corporate public relations. Claudia amplified on
the recent emergence of 'astroturf' lobbying, artificial
grassroots campaigns waged by TNCs, often with deceptive titles
such as the incineration-promoting 'Waste Watchers' group in
Germany. Eveline presented some examples of counter-strategies by
corporations, including co- optation, greenwashing,
divide-and-rule and dialogue. The latter, initiated by companies
with the advice of external PR consultants, is a corporate
strategy to avoid embarrassing conflict and unflattering media
coverage. The 'dialogue' issue re-emerged throughout the meeting.
During the following discussion, several participants mentioned
that certain PR companies, including Burson-Marsteller, are
already being targeted by activist groups.
Moving Ahead
The second day of the meeting was partially devoted to sharing
strategies for challenging corporate power. A number of
participants provided presentations on their campaigning against
specific TNCs and corporate lobby groups. Tarjei Leer- Salvesen
of Norwatch described how his organisation is a corporate
watchdog, keeping tabs on the activities of Norwegian-based TNCs
and publicising any negative or destructive practices to the
media and the public. Axel Koehler-Schnura of the Critical
Shareholders Association in Germany described the strategy of
purchasing shares in order to gain access to corporate
decision-making processes. He warned that this form of pressure
has its limitations -- fundamental change is not possible as the
underlying principle of profit-making can not be changed by
shareholder actions. Marc Gavaldá of Red Petrolera in Spain spoke
about campaigning on oil companies active in the Amazon. He
explained how international financial institutions including the
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank pave the way for
corporate penetration by promoting neoliberal legal systems and
privatisation. Antonio Tujan from the IBON Foundation in the
Philippines discussed the Asia Pacific Research Network, which
organises conferences and trainings and puts out publications on
various trade-related issues for groups in the region.
In the following discussions, several other examples of
strategies were presented and critiqued. It was pointed out that
although consumer action is important, public confusion can also
be created between mainstream businesses like the Body Shop and
true fair trade products. The effects of a Northern-based
consumer boycott on child labour in Bangladesh was also described
-- children were forced out of the factories and into
prostitution, as the fundamental problem of families needing
income was not resolved. The importance and difficulty of
building alliances with the labour movement was also discussed.
In a second round of presentations, Greg Muttitt of Corporate
Watch in the UK spoke about the use of non-violent direct action
to challenge corporate power, giving the examples of the massive
resistance against road-building schemes in the UK and campaigns
against genetic engineering which range from approaching shoppers
in supermarkets to uprooting genetically-manipulated crops. He
also mentioned some of the drawbacks of this type of campaigning,
including unpredictability, heavy dependence on large numbers of
activists and the media, and the tendency for the movement to be
largely white and middle class. Tarjei mentioned that the success
of the UK anti-GE food campaigns had spilled over to Norway,
where the government was scared off from introducing test fields.
Eveline Lubbers of Jansen & Jansen in the Netherlands gave a
presentation on net activism and tactical media. She present the
McSpotlight website (an anti-McDonald's site) [1] as a good
example of this type of campaigning. For activists, the Internet
has opened up many possibilities due to freedom of information
and the ease with which information can be spread. It was pointed
out however that the Internet is not without faults, ranging from
surveillance possibilities and its misuse by fascist and other
groups, to the elitist and exclusive nature of the technology
itself.
Amit Srivastava from TRAC in the US talked about campaigns
challenging corporate power in the United States and the need to
be inclusive. One of the biggest challenges is making the link
between community organising and global campaigns; whereas
grassroots organisers and affected communities tend to be people
of colour, anti-globalisation activists are generally white,
middle-class men. Tony Juniper of Friends of the Earth gave an
example of campaigning for environmental justice in the UK
through FoE's FactoryWatch website which allows people to
identify sources of pollution close to their homes. Juraj
Zamkovsky of FoE Slovakia spoke about campaigning against dam
building in Central and Eastern Europe, where more than 40
villages inhabited by some 25,000 people have been forcibly
relocated in the past decades. Corporate tactics to promote the
dams have included manipulating the public through media
campaigns, public meetings where false compensation promises were
given, manipulative public opinion polls, and various tactics to
weaken the resistance of affected communities. FoE Slovakia
provides communities with the tools to identify and fight against
these corporate tactics.
Tony Clarke from the Polaris Institute and the International
Forum on Globalization related some experiences from the MAI
campaigns which ended in success. From the beginning, the MAI was
clearly defined as a corporate rule treaty, which helped when
presenting arguments to the press and public. Campaigns were
built country-by-country, and the Internet was a very useful tool
for spreading information. Finally, alternatives to the MAI were
defined by campaigners. Helen Holder of A SEED Europe spoke about
campaigning against the biotech industry, and provided several
parallels to the anti-MAI campaign. Again, the opposition was
clear and had consensus on the undesirability of GM food, action
methods spread quickly from the UK to other countries and media
interest followed, and there was a clear alternative in organic
agriculture.
Tony Juniper of Friends of the Earth presented the campaign
against the Global Climate Coalition (GCC), a front group of oil,
automobile and energy companies that lobbied the Kyoto climate
negotiations. The strategy involved pressuring one member
company, in this case Shell, to step out of the GCC. In the
campaign, "Shell" was transformed into "hell", Shell "demons"
stood at gas stations with placards, and there was a large
demonstration outside of Shell's 100th anniversary celebration in
1997. In the end, Shell did leave the GCC, and public awareness
about the GCC was raised.
Olivier Hoedeman relayed the example of how CEO targeted
corporate lobby groups by writing to companies active in groups
like the European Roundtable of Industrialists and the
International Chamber of Commerce and requesting information
about their political activities. [2] Of those that responded,
most companies denied having political activities, or highlighted
only their activities in so-called "green" industry lobby groups.
The following discussion resulted in several ideas to clarify
the membership of companies in political lobby groups,
including a directory of corporate membership in lobby
groups, and Tony Clarke provided an example of a poster
made about the Canadian Business Council on National
Issues with photos of all of the corporate CEOs. It was
wondered whether or not it was strategic to target individual
CEOs rather than simply corporations. Several people felt
that particular CEOs should not be personalised. The need to
be very clear about our partners and our goals, to be clearly
distinguished from right-wing forces, was stressed by many.
The following session dealt with a strategically important,
worrying trend -- dialoguing between NGOs and industry. For
companies, it was pointed out, initiating dialogue is a way of
staving off criticism. Dialogue, some felt, delegitimises any
forms of engagement other than consensus and cooperation, thus
effectively disempowering NGOs. Tony Juniper stated that dialogue
should not be ruled out as a useful strategy in some
circumstances. CEOs can change their opinions when points are
powerfully made and profit is still possible. When companies
don't respond to demands made during dialogue, this can be used
against them in the press. Finally, dialoguing with the better
companies, e.g. those involved in solar and wind power, sends a
powerful message to other companies. Gregg Muttitt of Corporate
Watch in the UK cited research he had carried out indicating that
most mainstream NGOs in the UK are engaged in dialogue, and that
this can be seen as a real threat to groups engaging in
confrontation with TNCs. Dialogue is an extremely long and time-
consuming effort for NGOs, and diverts their attention from other
tasks. Furthermore, groups in the developing world tend to view
dialoguing as extremely negative.
In the discussion that followed, it was pointed out that
dialoguing tends to legitimise corporate voluntary agreements.
The need to make a distinction between TNCs that should be
dismantled and those that need only to be reformed -- and thus
are good targets for dialogue -- was mentioned. The vast
disparity in resources between corporations and NGOs was also
mentioned, as was a general feeling that dialoguing tends to
accomplish little in the end. The positive example of the
Forest Stewardship Council -- set up by NGOs with companies
invited to join -- was cited. Gregg ended the discussion by
saying that it is important to avoid divisiveness in
discussions like this one, as that is exactly what the
corporate world is hoping to create with their invitations to
dialogue.
Winding Down
One of the meeting's hosts in Córdoba, Carola Reintjes, gave a
short presentation on the socio-economic situation in Andalucía.
The region, with 8 million inhabitants, is very poor, with
employment reaching up to 45% in some regions. People have a
love-hate relationship with the EU. There has been lots of
financial input, but it mostly benefits large landholders and
most of the population feels forgotten by the EU. 90% of the
region's agriculture is exported and there is an invasion of
large supermarkets, yet there are still strong ties with
traditional and local food and culture.
Finally, there were reports given from the small working groups
on joint future projects and campaigns. The group discussing
general strategies agreed that it is essential to link struggles
in the North and South without repeating neo- colonial patterns,
and to make our movement more inclusive. The results of working
group meetings on the PR industry, on international trade
policies and on regulation of TNCs are summarised in the 'Córdoba
Declaration' which was agreed upon by the participants and is
included below.
-----
Notes
-----
1. <http://www.mcspotlight.org/>
2. See CEObserver, Issue 3 for the full story.
_________________________________________________________________
"CHALLENGING CORPORATE POWER"
THE CÓRDOBA DECLARATION
_________________________________________________________________
From October 14 - 17, 1999, thirty progressive activists and
researchers assembled in Córdoba, Spain, for a European strategy
session, solidifying an international network and movement
challenging the increasing power of corporations.
While corporate power is not a new phenomenon, in the last
decade, the political activities and influence of corporations
have reached new levels -- threatening the pursuit of
democracy and social and environmental standards. The growing
gap between rich and poor, loss of livelihood, cuts in social
services, mass unemployment and the scapegoating of immigrants
are some glaring examples of this trend. In addition the
privatisation of essential services such as health care,
housing, education and utilities prioritises the realisation
of profits over public interests.
Important factors contributing to the rise of corporate power
include the process of globalisation and the rise of
neoliberalism. Following trade and investment liberalisation,
mega-corporations operating on a global scale increasingly
dominate economies. In the pursuit of international
competitiveness, governments adopt regulations and free-up
economic resources to serve the needs of corporations to the
detriment of people and the environment around the world.
Corporations have organised themselves in a web of lobby groups
on the national, regional and global level, such as the European
Roundtable of Industrialists and the International Chamber of
Commerce. They have benefited from the ongoing transfer of
political power to anti-democratic international structures such
as the European Union and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Far
reaching corporate-state alliances have emerged in the last few
years, such as the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD). They
show a chilling reality of how far policies are being shaped
around corporate priorities. Also, the increasingly close
liaisons between the United Nations and business is an
unacceptable trend. Another central element of corporate
political power is the rise of a multi-billion euro public
relations (PR) industry and media corporations which work with
business in manipulating public perception on a wide range of
issues where commercial interests are at stake.
Campaigns on climate change and international trade and
investment treaties -- such as the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI) and the World Trade Organisation -- as well
as the growing revolt against genetically modified foods and
movements against privatisation and deregulation in the South
provide inspiring examples of how diverse social movements are
challenging corporate power.
The time has come to intensify our efforts to structurally
challenge the political activities and power exercised by
corporations and their lobby groups. This means rejecting the
current agenda-setting role of business and anti-democratic
alliances between corporations and states.
Limiting economic concentration and dependency on
mega-corporations is a necessary part of any attempt to roll back
corporate political power, and allows the social and
environmental agenda to reclaim political space. Codes of Conduct
and other voluntary initiatives have proven to be insufficient
and to be primarily corporate strategies to protect and further
their own interests. Enforceable standards for corporate social
and environmental behaviour are imperative.
As the next steps in our efforts to roll back corporate power, we
have agreed to work together to:
- Work to share information and strategies to challenge
corporate power (direct action, critical shareholder
campaigns, corporate watchdog activities, etc.)
- Expose and challenge the major corporations involved in the
public relations industry.
- Expose the impact of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue on
government regulations and institutions and the political
influence gained by large companies through this
anti-democratic corporate-state alliance.
- Prevent WTO negotiations on new issues and demand a full
independent review of the impact of the Uruguay Round
agreements on people and environment.
- Reject the "Global Compact" between the United Nations
and international business as it is based on the flawed
concept of self regulation by "corporate global citizens".
Córdoba, 17 October 1999
_________________________________________________________________
DISCLAIMER
_________________________________________________________________
The magazine Nexus has, in its latest issue, reprinted our
report "WTO Millennium Bug: TNC Control over Global Trade
Politics" (July 1999), despite the fact that CEO explicitly
refused Nexus permission to do so. The editorial of the
magazine mentions our rejection and ends with a provoking "so
here it is, but without their blessing!" In the Spring of
1998, after Nexus had reprinted our report "MAIgalomania" we
discovered the problematic character of this magazine. We
found "MAIgalomania" next to articles on UFOs and dubious
conspiracy theories and decided not to allow them to reprint
our material in the future.
Nexus -- published monthly from Australia, distributed
worldwide -- covers "the fields of health alternatives;
suppressed science; Earth's ancient past; UFOs & the
unexplained; and government cover-ups." [1] Articles with
titles like "Mind Control Slavery and the New World Order",
"Meetings With Remarkable Aliens" and "UK Crop Circles of
1999" are illustrative for the content of Nexus. More
seriously is the fact that the magazine has repeatedly printed
texts by authors belonging to the far right, which has
resulted in Nexus being listed in the Tel Aviv University
archive of anti-Semitic literature. [2] Its website has links
to the homepages of the controversial new age icon David Icke
as well as to websites with telling titles like "The Ashes of
Waco" and "The Militia of Montana".
When Nexus wrote us to ask if they could reprint our WTO
report, we explained them that we disagree with Nexus
"promoting a vision of a world governed by conspiracies,
publishing any story that fits the image of shady, secretive
political, religious and even extraterrestrial (?) groups
pursuing terrible scenarios." [3] We told the editor that
"both in target group and in our political goals, we see no
basis for cooperation with NEXUS magazine." Nexus wrote back
saying that they "simply publish unusual and hard to get
information" and that they would publish the article anyway.
We have done our best, but in vain, to explain the editors of
Nexus that our reports on the MAI and the WTO are not
describing conspiracies, but examples of undemocratic
international treaty making. We explicitly distance ourselves
from conspiracy theories, as these completely miss the
point. The power of corporations is not based on secretive
dealings. Most of the information we use is freely and easily
accessible, often also through the internet. Journalists could
dive into these issues and get the information without any
serious obstacles. When news featuring examples of corporate
political power are not mainstream news, this is due to the
reality of corporate mass media today, not because of
conspiracies.
-----
Notes
-----
1. According to the Nexus website:
<http://www.nexusmagazine.com/>
2. In the report "Anti-Semitism Worldwide 1997/8", Nexus is
listed for printing anti-Semitic texts.
The report can be found on the website of the Tel Aviv
University's Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of
Contemporary Anti-Semitism and Racism :
<http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/>
3. Letter to Duncan Roads, Nexus editor, 21 October 1999.
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